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Abstract – This paper analyzes the investor behavior in 
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investors’ main behavioral features are addressed, notably 
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order to obtain an individual and an aggregated 
behavioral profile of the investor in situations of extreme 
events. 
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1. Introduction 
The complexity and dynamics of the financial 
markets make this matter an extremely interesting 
subject for analysis. More specifically, the increas d 
instability of the markets, characterized by periods of 
strong speculation and by crashes, affects 
macroeconomic and monetary stability. This reality has 
led in part to a rise in related studies and therefore 
allowed many new hypotheses. Different proposals have 
been made to shed light on the dynamics of the market 
and its recent shape.  
This is the context in which we debate investors’ 
behavior in extreme situations in the financial market. It 
is demonstrated that investors can develop cooperativ  
attitudes in a speculative period (known as bubble) so as 
to maintain a favorable position that brings above 
average benefits; in addition, their actions are flawed in 
more unstable situations i.e. prior to and even at the 
exact moment of a crash. 
Firstly, a methodological approach to the problem 
based on considerations about investors’ behavior, 
notably cognitive and with intellectual limitations, is 
presented. Then some characteristics implicit to chice 
in uncertainty are defined.  
This involves making a brief review of the intrinsic 
characteristics of extreme, but real, events based 
specially on the market crashes of 1929 and 2000.  
Finally, a game theory model is presented for the 
problem under analysis, departing from the assumption 
that investors do not make use of any type of arbitrage 
or hedging strategies, and their investment decisions are 
geared to stocks (and in bonds only to minimize the 
risk); the investment in other instruments, like 
derivatives, is only considered in the case of a strong 
link to stocks. It is important to note that the choice of 
this type of approach (game theory) is essentially due to 
its focus on the behavior and decisions of the players 
individually and in group. The impact of the dynamics 
and actions of players on the market where the game is 
played is also analyzed.  
2. Some features of investor behavior  
Human beings have always been the direct or 
indirect focus of theories in the financial and social 
sciences generally. Human behavior and its respective 
features have been a key element for the success of 
several models, either from a micro or macro point f 
view. 
This has played a major role in the research into 
financial markets. As can be seen in the first major 
studies on portfolio theory, made initially by Markowitz 
(1952) and later by Sharpe (1962) and Ross (1976), the 
definition and concretization of the investor’s behavior 
was key to the efficiency and explanatory capacity of 
these models.  
However, the lack of accuracy demonstrated by 
these models in several market situations opened th 
way to new approaches which essentially focus on the 
characteristic features of the investor and his respective 
decisions. This has provided new possibilities to 
understand some events. 
2.1. The Rationality postulate and the 
deficiencies in information processing 
The rationality and consequently the processing 
and use of information in the decision-making process 
are topics that have always intrigued economic and 
financial researchers. The association of the proposition 
of rationality to the economic man, made by several 
theorists, has been used, across the years, as a powerful 
assumption in the construction of several models. 
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Following this idea, it is assumed that the agent has t e 
knowledge to make the best possible decisions in the 
existing environment and with the intrinsic limitatons, 
supported by a well-organized and stable system of 
preferences, and in a context of perfect information, 
leading him to the best possible action (Simon, 1955).  
It is therefore assumed that in a context of perfect 
information, the agent can process this information 
correctly and thus make the right decisions; an 
imperfect decision can be the result of an asymmetric 
information context.  
However, despite the acclamation of the rationality 
postulate to be a vital assumption to several models, the 
Keynesian theory, for example, showed that good 
predictive models can be constructed in a way that is not 
based on this postulate (Blaug, 1992). As Arrow (1987: 
70) refers: “I don’t know any serious derivation about 
the currency demand based on rational optimization”.  
Therefore, an in-depth analysis of this issue is 
made, starting with an overview of the orthodox 
financial theory, followed by the ideas of the 
behaviorists, evolutionists and neuroeconomic theorists. 
The main objective is to provide an alternative 
theoretical background to support the non-appliance of 
the utilitarian agent in the subsequent model derived 
later on.  
2.1.1. The Financial vision of Rationality 
Markowitz (1952) was the first to bring a well 
designed approach for the selection of assets and 
construction of an asset portfolio to the financial theory. 
In his attempt to explain the allocation and selection of 
securities in a portfolio, he made a set of assumptions, 
notably the rationality principle. More specifically, it is 
assumed that within a context of perfect information the 
investor maximizes (or should maximize) the 
discounted expected returns, and diversifies (or shuld 
diversify) his funds among all the available securities, 
leading to a situation of maximum expected return and  
mean-variance portfolio (Markowitz, 1952).  
Some years later, the Capital Asset Pricing Model, 
known as CAPM, was developed in articles by William 
Sharpe (1964), John Lintner (1965) and Jan Mossin 
(1966). This model focuses on the relationship betwe n 
the level of risk and the expected return of an asset and 
on the following and subsequent equilibria. The set of 
assumptions used is quite similar to what was used by 
Markowitz. All investors are rational mean-variance 
optimizers; hence, if all investors are rational, they will 
all analyze securities in the same way and share the 
same beliefs, which leads to homogeneous expectations 
(Bodie et al, 2009).  
Another important asset pricing model is known as 
the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) by Stephen Ross 
(1976). Though similar to CAPM, it is more general in 
the sense that the security returns are described through 
a factor or a set of factors related with the 
macroeconomic, financial or business sector 
environment. The main assumption is that a well-
functioning security market does not allow the 
persistence of arbitrage opportunities because securiti s 
are not mispriced over a long period of time (Bodie et 
al, 2009; Ross, 1976). 
Notwithstanding some other important models, it is 
turn lastly to the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). 
Like the abovementioned assumptions, EMH assumes 
the market to be efficient and that individuals are 
rational. Basically, a market is efficient if the traded 
assets reflect all the available information in a given 
time, and if the price of the asset adjusts as quickly as 
possible to the new information; this leads to a random 
walk as the prices change unpredictably (Bodie et al, 
2009). 
2.1.2. The behaviorists critique and alternative 
Despite the huge advances brought by the 
abovementioned theories to the evolution of financil 
and economic theory, they tend to fail in several 
situations because they are usually based on a normative 
analysis, which is concerned with the rational soluti n 
for the decision-making problem. This solution results 
from the definition of the ideal decisions to approach, 
rather than a descriptive analysis of the way in which 
real people actually make decisions (Kahneman and 
Riepe, 1998). 
One of the critiques made by behavioral finance is 
that almost all investors suffer from biases of judgment 
and decision-making, sometimes called cognitive 
illusions. For this reason, the investor does not always 
process information correctly and tends to assume risks 
that do not acknowledge; this leads to incorrect 
probability distributions and inconsistent and 
systematically suboptimal decisions (Bodie et al, 2009; 
Kahneman and Riepe, 1998). 
Overconfidence is one such bias. When the 
investor makes his own prediction, he often sets a very
narrow confidence interval, thinking of specific 
quantities and anchoring too much in his own 
prediction. Unfortunately, few people are able to 
calibrate their predictions well and judgment errors a e 
common. Moreover, this phenomenon is expected in 
dynamic environments where the agent systematically 
faces different problems and cannot learn with past 
examples as quickly as other agents in more stable 
environments (De Bondt, 1998; Kahneman and Riepe, 
1998). If the investor is rational, the environment will 
be indifferent to his decision, making it well calibrated 
and leading to the same or similar behavior to that 
described in financial models.  
Optimism is another important bias that supports 
the critique made by behavioral finance to the 
rationality postulate. The agent tends to rely too much 
on his own beliefs and talents so that he exaggerates the 
future outcome. Mixing optimism with overconfidence 
will generate an overestimation of the knowledge 
acquired and an underestimation of the risks, leading to 
an illusion of control in most events (Kahneman and 
Riepe, 1998; Shiller, 2000). 
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While these two biases are a great constraint to the 
investor’s decision-making process, the hindsight bias 
can also play an important role because it encourages 
the agent to see the future as more predictable than i  
really is, and this will heighten overconfidence. If the 
event had been predicted, many of the bad situations 
would have been avoided because almost everyone 
would have modified their actions (Shiller, 2000). 
Over-reacting to change events is another bias that 
is closely linked to the overconfidence phenomena. The
investor believes that random moves are more likely to 
occur than systematic ones, impelling him to perceive 
patterns that do not exist; this indicates overconfidence 
in judgments about uncertain events (Kahneman and 
Riepe, 1998). 
All four judgment biases are generated and 
amplified by certain types of anchor. In general, peo le 
tend to anchor too much because, when making 
ambiguous and complex decisions, they are influenced 
by the readily available information. The 
overconfidence and optimism biases may appear in 
situations where the investor uses quantitative anchors, 
e.g. the most recently remembered price or the nearest 
milestone to a major index. These anchors can lead to 
several judgment errors, creating an illusion prediction. 
On the other hand, moral anchors can be responsible for 
the hindsight bias because when the market is not 
working well, people tend to hold on to stories and 
intuitive reasons to embrace their investments and to see 
a more predictable world than actually exists. The 
fragility of these anchors lies in the agent’s difficulty in 
using them to think ahead to contingent future decisions 
(De Bondt, 1998; Shiller, 2000). 
Another limitation of the rational decision process 
is due to the heuristics used. In the original Greek 
definition, adopted by Duncker (1945), heuristic “serves 
to find out or discover” and is used to describe strategies 
such as “looking around” and “inspecting the problem”. 
A few years later, Simon (1955) defined heuristics as 
strategies that facilitate decisions. More recently, he 
term has evolved, especially in the decision-making 
segment to denote strategies that help to find and to 
discover correct answers to problems in the probabilistic 
area of decision (Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2002).        
However, when dealing with optimizer behavior, 
the use of heuristics to solve problems sometimes leads 
to judgment errors and inefficient final outcomes. The 
representativeness heuristic is an example of this.In 
uncertain situations, a judgment is made by looking at 
familiar patterns and making an assumption that the 
future will resemble past patterns. In these cases, even 
without a sufficient consideration about these patterns, 
probabilities can be forgotten which results in 
overconfidence. Individuals dealing with uncertain 
environments such as financial markets may use this 
short-cut and make decision mistakes (Shiller, 2000; 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). In addition, recognitio  
heuristic reflects a lack of information processing by the 
agent. It is used when the agent faces a choice between 
two or more objects. In these situations, the known 
object has a higher value in the individual’s decision 
criteria. This heuristic relies on low cognitive ability 
and is often systematic. The problem focuses on the fact 
that the individual chooses the recognized object 
because he has more information about it and acting 
against the recognized object requires more cognitive 
effort (Pachur and Hertwig, 2006; Volz et al, 2006). 
Another heuristic that influences the decision-making 
process is known as the adjustment and anchoring 
heuristic. The anchoring process was examined above, 
but in this particularly case it is associated to the mental 
short cut of adjustment. In some uncertain situations, the 
agent estimates the final outcome, starting from a given 
initial value that is adjusted over time to yield the final 
result. Different initial or starting points obviously yield 
different estimations that are biased toward the initial 
values, in a phenomena caused by the anchoring. This 
problem is catalyzed essentially by insufficient 
adjustment and the existence of biases in the evaluation 
of events that are known as conjunctive (events that
must occur in conjugation with others, like a multiple 
step plan); and disjunctive (events that are successful if 
at least one event is favorable) (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1974). 
2.1.3. Evolutionism approach 
Evolutionism is another approach that represents a 
different way of analyzing the rationality postulate. The 
application of Darwin’s theory of evolution to economic 
and social sciences has been controversial in recent 
years, principally because some authors consider it too 
mechanic and biological to be applied to the dynamics 
of sciences that deal with social and economic problems 
(Aldrich et al, 2007). 
Despite these critiques, nowadays evolutionism is 
an important theory that can give a valid alternative to 
the rationality postulate.  
The critique of the rationality postulate implied in 
the orthodox financial and economic theory is sustained, 
in the most general and simplified way, by the theory of 
Mayr (1988), known as paradigm of program-based 
behavior. 
Mayr’s theory essentially relies on the fact that an 
agent’s behavior can be seen and guided by programs 
encoded to face different situations. These programs 
allow the agent to foresee and face the consequences of 
his potential choices in uncertain environments. These 
programs are constructed and mutated by a process of 
learning and evolution, through which they become 
more adapted to the relevant characteristics of given 
problems and environments. This process tends to 
eliminate and replace inadequate programs with new 
programs with different characteristics and knowledge 
in order to make decision-making more accurate. Thus, 
programs tend to be more adapted to the different 
problems and are a product of the agents’ evolution and 
learning (Mayr, 1988; Vanberg, 2004). 
The implication of this theory to this discussion 
relies on the possibility for specific actions to be not 
rational (from an optimizer way of thinking), even if 
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programs are well adapted to the particular problem and 
environment. It is allowed trough this theory the 
possibility of the existence of a systematic account for 
observed behaviors that can be considered as irrational 
and that are classified as anomalies (Vanberg, 2004). 
2.1.4. The role of emotions and the 
neuroeconomic analysis 
The role of emotions in the decision-making 
process and questions related to the analysis of 
utilitarian rationality has received growing support in 
recent years. Neuroeconomics is one field that has 
devoted considerable effort to this area. One of the main 
points of research in neuroeconomics is the relation 
between brain activity and the choice and decision-
making process under uncertain conditions. The neural 
reactions to some situations of choice can lead to a 
better understanding of how some decisions and actions 
are taken.  
Damásio (1994) gives two examples that illustrate 
this problem. The first is that of Phineas Gage who lived 
in the mid 19th century in New England. He was a 
foreman working on the construction of a railroad. On a 
given day, when he was trying to detonate a pile of 
rocks, an iron bar was projected into his face, enteri g 
in the left side of his face and getting out by theop of 
his head. Phineas did not die and was fully conscious 
when he went to the hospital. Doctors today would 
know that this was a lesion in the Ventromedial 
Prefrontal Cortex and that the other important brain 
lobes were fully intact. Although he resumed normal 
life two months later, but never more was the same. Th  
balance between the intellectual and instinctive sides 
had been destroyed and he became unpredictable and 
indecisive, displayed few emotions, made countless 
plans for the future which were easily abandoned. He 
was no longer able to work as a foreman, but the same 
problems arose when he did other jobs. He was unable 
to make decisions that were coherent with his 
knowledge. He died years later from a pathology known 
as status epilecpticus.  
Damásio’s second example is that of Elliot who 
had a brain tumor known as Meningioma; this was 
surgically treated by removing frontal lobe tissue but a 
lesion in the cortical region had damaged the 
Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex (the temporal, occipital 
and pariental regions were intact, as were the basal 
ganglions and thalamus). Nevertheless, he made a good 
recovery but, like Phineas, was never the same again. 
He rarely got angry, and rare were the situations when 
he expressed emotions. This was caused by poor access 
to the social knowledge which is essential to more 
advanced reasoning. Some of the tests conducted 
revealed he was unable to make an efficient decision 
and sometimes no decision at all (Procrastination). 
In these cases and others of lesions in the 
Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex, patients show 
diminished emotional responsiveness and limited social 
emotions, closely associated to moral values. They also
sometimes exhibit above average tolerance to anger and 
frustration which generally lead to bad or inefficient 
decisions. Notwithstanding, their general intelligenc , 
logic reasoning and knowledge is unaffected (Koenigs 
et al, 2007). 
This profile of a VMPC (Ventromedial Prefrontal 
Cortex) patient can be explained by Damásio’s Somatic 
Marker (1994). In cases of decision-making which 
require the evaluation of future consequences, the 
somatic marker classifies the future action as good r 
bad. The somatic state makes the decisions quicker and 
more effective. Lesions to the Ventromedial Prefrontal 
Cortex cause the somatic signals guiding the action to 
fails. As a result, patients show indifference to possible 
future consequences of their actions, and are unable to 
see beyond the present. (Butman and Allegri, 2001; 
Damásio, 1994) 
According to some empirical studies by Bechara et 
al (1994, 1996 and 1997), and Koenigs et al (2007), the 
main conclusion, is that VMPC patients have more 
utilitarian judgments and act more according to the
economic and financial doctrine of rationality although 
may not be the best strategy (because this behavior does 
not take into account the importance of emotions in the 
decision-making process).  In studies using card games, 
VMPC patients prefer to take risks and dangerous bet
without considering the future outcomes of their actions. 
In the study by Koenigs et al (2007), VMPC patients 
have no difficulty in taking decisions in more emotional 
and stressful situations, which leads to more ineffci nt 
decisions/outcomes in a utilitarian way.  
It can be concluded that the emotional side plays an 
important role in the decision-making process, leading 
to more efficient choices. It is known that uncontrlled 
emotions can lead to irrational behavior. But the 
reduction of emotions can lead to equal irrationally 
behavior (Damásio, 1994). 
If emotions are responsible for irrational and 
rational decisions, the individual is not fully rational. 
But without emotions and with an increase in the 
utilitarian judgment, his decisions can be equally 
irrational and so the rationality postulate implied in 
most of the models cannot be correct. 
2.2. The dynamics of the investor behavior  
Arriving at this point, it is appropriate to analyze 
the particularities of the investor in a dynamic 
environment, highlighting and detailing the factors that 
determine his behavior in the market. 
In investment dynamics, many decisions are made 
and this process is extremely intensive and demanding. 
It is important to define the features that determine the 
process to provide a profile of the investor. Thus, a brief 
review over the preferences of the investor’s 
preferences, the way he makes a choice and the 
determinants affecting the decision-making process will 
be made. 
2.2.1. The vision of orthodox financial theory  
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In financial theory, the investor’s features are part 
of aggregated models that try to make a macro 
explanation of market behavior; this implies defining a 
more general, and less precise, set of assumptions for 
the investor.  
In this context, the first assumption refers to the
investor’s preference to smooth his consumption, 
because of: (1) Time Consumption and the (2) Risk 
Dimension. The first is based on the fact that 
consumption is higher than the income in the early years 
of active life, because of situations like purchasing a 
house or a car. However, during those times, savings are 
constituted, that will be spent after retirement when the 
income is zero and consumption is positive. The risk
dimension factor is based on the fact that the future is 
uncertain and that many states of nature can occur, 
which in turn makes it necessary to level off 
consumption so that it is not excessively concentrated in 
potentially unfavorable periods (Danthine and 
Donaldson, 2005). 
Based on this, the process of decision-making can 
be divided into situations of certainty and uncertainty. 
While the assumption of rationality can be accepted in a 
situation of certainty (with the appropriate reservations 
because the choice depends on the framing of the 
problem) with every investor having a complete 
preference relation and the property of transitivity in a 
continuous relation, this is more difficult to occur in 
uncertain situations. In these situations (like a lottery), it 
is assumed that the preference relation is complete, 
transitive and continuous, with an independence of 
irrelevant alternatives. This last assumption is not 
common ground because it depends, for example, on the 
way in which the problem is placed (framing); this will 
be analyzed in more detail below (Danthine and 
Donaldson, 2005; Huang and Litzenberger, 1988). 
Another assumption is that the investor is risk-
averse, because he usually wants to avoid a fair gamble 
(when in an uncertain environment); his utility function 
is concave because, as the wealth increases, the utility 
from the additional consumption decreases (also known 
as decreasing marginal utility). However, despite not
being assumed directly in the portfolio theory, this 
degree of risk-aversion can be measured in two ways: a) 
in terms of absolute risk aversion (ARA), that is, 
sensitivity to the amount and; b) relative risk-aversion 
(RRA), i.e. sensitivity to the proportion of wealth at 
stake. Thus, it is assumed that an investor will only play 
a fair game if there is a certainty equivalent, i.e. if there 
is an amount of money that is a certain equivalent to the 
investment that he could make (Holt and Laury, 2002).  
Assuming the above, the problem for the investor 
is to maximize the expected utility of his wealth 
allocated in the possible investments. To do so, he 
integrates mean-variance preferences so that when there
are investments with the same mean, he chooses the one 
with the smaller variance, and in the case of investm nts 
with the same variance, he chooses the one with the 
larger mean (Markowitz, 1952).   
Every investor will generally possess the market 
portfolio and will invest in a risk-free asset (in order to 
respect the two fund separation), so the wealth will be 
allocated between the rf (risk free asset) and the 
tangency portfolio. But because the investor is risk-
averse, he will only invest in the risky asset if hs 
expected return is higher than the rf (McDonald and 
Siegel, 1986). Then it will be respect mean-variance 
dominance: 
Asset	a	dominates	asset	b	if	 μa≥μb	and	ϑa<ϑborμa>μb	and	ϑa≤ϑb 				(1)	
Moreover, he will look for changes in the 
composition of the portfolio in terms of the correlation; 
this implies that the construction of the portfolio will 
mainly take securities that have a correlation of between 
]-1;1[ into consideration (Bodie t al, 2009; Markowitz, 
1952). 
It is assumed that a more risk-averse investor will 
allocate less wealth on the stock market; however, this 
sometimes depends on the intrinsic utility function f 
the investor.  
Also, according to the CAPM, all investors possess 
the market portfolio and will therefore be pleased when 
the market goes up and sorrowful when it goes down; 
because they respect the law of decreasing marginal 
utility. This implies that what really matters to the 
investor is getting additional good payoffs in bad 
circumstances (of low market returns), which in turn 
makes the investor less enthusiastic about additional 
payoffs in good times. It can therefore be concluded that 
the investors like assets with low covariance with the
market (Bodie et al, 2009). 
2.2.2. An alternative based on Behavioral 
Economics and Finance  
(a) Hyperbolic Discounting  
Most decisions made by an investor involve a 
trade-off between outcomes/choices that will have 
effects on different periods; which in the real markets 
imply that the investor has to decide between 
investment options that may be more valuable in the 
future than in the present. This relation is captured in a 
conventional analysis by a discount function. With the
help of this instrument, it is possible to measure th
utility obtained from a series of future consumption 
situations, occurring at regular intervals, leading to the 
calculation of a Discounted Utility Function.  
U'=∑ F(d)nd=0 u c(t+d)#																																																(2)	
Where F(d) is the discount function, t the time of 
evaluation and c(t+d) the resources consumed at time 
t+d.  
Thus, the discount function is a declining function 
of delay and often given by a discount rate r, which is 
the proportional change in the value of F(d) over a 
standard time period. It is also important to note that the 
decision maker is impatient and the rate of change of 
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F(d) is the pure rate of time preference. In addition, f r 
rational decision makers, the rate in which money 
should be discounted must equal their marginal rate of 
substitution between the present and the future to the 
market interest rate.  
Taking the following example: if we actually prefer 
5€ in 3 months to 4€ in 2 months, then in 2 months time 
we will prefer the 5€ in 1 month to 4€ immediately 
unless there is a sudden need for cash. However, this 
may not occur with certainty and can imply an 
inconsistent time preference. Taking the examples given 
by Ainslie (1975), Ainslie (1991) and Read (2003) 
where we have a choice between two alternatives: a 
smaller-sooner (X) and a larger-later (Y); while the 
larger-later alternative is preferred when both are 
substantially delayed, when smaller-sooner alternative 
becomes imminent it undergoes a rapid increase in 
value and is briefly preferred. For example, the smaller-
sooner reward can be the pleasure from a cigarette and 
the larger-later reward might be good health. The 
prospect of good health is preferred when looking oe
week ahead, but the desire for the cigarette grows faster 
than the desire for good health as time passes, until, for 
what may be a very brief period, the cigarette is 
preferred.  
This kind of situation makes it difficult for the 
agent to plan the future and stick to it, which 
degenerates into procrastination. This example also 
shows that the discount rate does not always change 
proportionally to the value of F(d) over a standard time 
period like the one referred. Due to these time 
inconsistencies, a hyperbolic discount function canbe 
the best way to illustrate this type of behaviour, instead 
of exponential discount functions as assumed when t 
decision maker is a rational agent, because it considers 
there may be a brief and temporary reversal in 
preferences (Read, 2003).It can therefore be said that 
individuals do not always smooth their consumption 
because, at one point in time, the agent may revers his 
preferences (Steel and König, 2006).  
 
Figure 1: Possibility of reversal of preferences (Steel 
and König, 2006) 
Another point that is not consensual is the 
consideration that money should be discounted at the 
prevailing market rate (Thaler, 1981). In fact, peol  do 
not apply the same rate to all decisions, being instead 
this rate highly domain dependent and even in the 
domain context dependent from the choice context 
(Chapman and Elstein, 1995). In addition to time 
inconsistency, several anomalies, linked to the constant 
discount theory can be summarized: 
• Delay effect: if we elicit the present-value of a 
delayed outcome or the future value of an 
immediate outcome, then the longer the delay, the 
larger the obtained value of the discounting factor 
(Read, 2003); 
• Interval effect: The difference between the delays 
of two outcomes is the interval between them. So 
discounting depends heavily on the length of this 
interval, in that longer intervals lead to smaller 
discount rates or larger discount functions (Read, 
2001); 
• Magnitude effect: This means that the discount 
rate is higher for smaller amounts (Green t al, 
1997; Read, 2003; Shelley, 1993); 
• Direction effect: the discount rate obtained by 
increasing the delay of an outcome is greater than 
that of reducing that same delay (Loewenstein, 
1988; Read 2003); 
• Sign effect: The discount rate is lower for losses 
than for gains (Antonides and Wunderink, 2001; 
Thaler, 1981); 
• Sequence effects: A sequence is a set of dated 
outcomes all of which are expected to occur, such 
as one’s salary or mortgage payments. People 
usually prefer constant or increasing sequences to 
decreasing ones, even when the total amount in the 
sequence is held constant (Chapman, 1996); 
(b) Prospect Theory 
For orthodox financial theory, the evaluation of 
outcomes and the decision-making process can be 
analyzed by taking the expected utility theory into 
consideration. In this theory, it is assumed that investors 
attempt to maximize the expected utility of their choices 
between risky options, giving weight to each outcome 
according to their probability and choosing the onewith 
the highest weighted sum (Luce and Raiffa, 1952). It is
also assumed that the psychological value of money or 
goods follows the rule of diminishing marginal utility, 
which is represented by a concave utility function, 
implying the presence of risk aversion (Levy, 1992). 
Prospect Theory however posits a different way of 
analyzing this problem. It is assumed that the agents 
evaluate outcomes based on the deviations from a given 
reference point, instead of the level of net assets or 
value. The real deal, however, is the identification of 
this reference point. At the moment zero, it is usually 
assumed to be the status quo, but in some other cases it 
may be the aspiration level or another point. Allied to 
this, the agent is not always risk-averse and this varies 
depending on whether we are dealing with gains or 
losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  
For example, an experiment by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) gave the choice of a certain outcome f 
$ 3000 vs. 80% chance of winning $ 4000 and 20% 
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chance of winning nothing. 80% of the respondents 
chose the certain outcome. However, when dealing with 
the same problem but in a negative frame, 92% chose to 
gamble when there was 80% chance of losing $ 4000 
and 20% of losing nothing to a certain loss of $ 3000. In 
both cases the option with the lower expected value was 
chosen, which is incoherent with the expected utility 
theory and highlights the risk profiles. It suggests that 
individual utility functions are concave for the domain 
of gains and convex for the domain of losses; this is a
pattern known as the reflection effect to the refernce 
point. This implies that the sensitivity to changes in 
assets decreases as one moves further in either direction 
from the reference point (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; 
Laury and Holt, 2000).  
 
 
Figure 2: Prospect Theory utility function (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979) 
However, the previous example shows that the 
propensity for risk depends on the way in which the
problem is placed, i.e. the way it is framed. For 
example, in Kahneman (2002), to subjects were given 
the hypothetical choice between programs to outbreak a 
disease which was expected to kill 600 people. On the 
first attempt: program A corresponded to 200 people 
saved while in program B there was a 1/3 chance that 
600 people would be saved (and no one die) and 2/3 that 
no people would be saved. On a second attempt: 
program A implied the death of 400 people and program 
B corresponded to a chance of 1/3 of people not dying 
and a 2/3 probability of people dying. The results 
showed that on the first attempt the majority of 
respondents chose program A, which indicates risk 
aversion. However, on the second attempt, program B 
was mainly chosen, which indicates risk-seeking 
behavior. It can be concluded that on the first attempt 
the possibility of certainly saving people was more 
attractive than a probability; on the other hand, 
respondents were averse to accepting the certain deth 
of people and thus sought more risky alternatives 
(Kahneman, 2002). 
Allied to this context, there are two types of effect 
that influence the decision-making process. First, the
certainty effect, which impels the individuals to 
overweight outcomes which are certain relatively to 
outcomes that are merely probable. Also, they 
overweight low probabilities and underweight moderat  
or high probabilities. The latter effect is more 
pronounced. Therefore, extremely likely but uncertain 
outcomes are often treated as if they were certain; this is 
known as the pseudocertainty effect (Levy, 1992). Also 
changes on probabilities near to 0 or 1 have a greater 
impact on preferences than comparable changes in the 
middle probability range, leading to behaviors of 
subproportionality (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986). 
(c) Mental Accounting  
The mental accounting theory has proven to be a 
partially effective and efficient approach, along with the 
prospect theory, to understand the behaviour of agents 
and particularly of investors. For Kahneman and 
Tversky (1984), mental accounting is an outcome frame 
which specifies a set of elementary outcomes that are 
evaluated jointly and the manner in which they are 
combined; it is a reference outcome that is considered 
neutral or normal. It supports three important features: 
the prospect theory value function over gains and losses 
is used in relation to a reference point; both gain and 
loss functions display diminishing sensitivity; at the 
initial reference point (status quo) the agent is risk 
averse (Thaler, 1999). 
One of the main proposals of this theory is that 
people behave according to the hedonic framing 
proposition, i.e. they segregate gains and integrat 
losses (because the respective functions are concave and 
convex) and more specifically, integrate smaller losses 
with larger gains and segregate small gains from larger 
losses (Thaler, 1985; Thaler, 1999). However, this 
proposition can sometimes fail, principally for the 
integration of losses, as Thaler and Johnson (1990) 
showed in their research. People sometimes think it is 
good to integrate losses, which intuitively implies that it 
should diminish the marginal impact and suggests that a 
prior loss makes them more sensitive to subsequent 
losses (Thaler, 1999). 
Mental accounting therefore predicts that, if for 
example, we buy, s stocks at p price, the investment will 
initially be worth [s * p]  and will fluctuate in 
accordance with the evolution of stocks on the market. 
In fact, even with changes over time, which implies 
theoretical gains or losses, it only becomes a realized 
gain or loss when this position it is sold. An account 
will be opened with [s * p]  and will be closed with the 
realized result, which can compensate or not for the 
initial investment. But because closing an account at a 
loss is painful to the investor, the prediction of mental 
accounting is that investors will be reluctant to sell 
securities that have declined in value. If at a given 
moment the investor has a need for cash, he will look at 
his asset portfolio (which for example contains  
securities) and will sell those with a higher value than at 
the time of purchase. However, this hypothesis 
contradicts a rational analysis that postulates that e 
investor should sell the securities that were lower than 
their initial value. However, the assumption made by 
mental accounting theory can be supported on the 
example of Odean (1998) that, using data from 
transactions made by a big brokerage firm, had show 
that investors were more willing to sell one of their 
stocks that had increased in value than one that had 
decreased.  
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Another particularity analyzed by mental 
accounting is that sometimes the investor suffers from 
behaviour termed myopic loss aversion. This behaviour 
is analyzed in detail in the Equity Premium Puzzle of 
Benartzi and Thaler (1995); it focuses on the difference 
in the rate of return of equities and a safe investm nt 
like treasury bills, which historically has been very large 
(6% in the USA in the past 70 years) and which result d 
in the appreciation of 1 dollar invested in equities 
almost 120 times the return from the dollar invested in 
treasury bills. However, T-Bills was the primary 
destination for investment in these years. The 
explanation for this puzzle was that the investor’s loss 
aversion is strictly dependent on the frequency with 
which he reset his reference point (or how often he 
counts his money). The result was that people are 
indifferent as to investing in stocks or T-Bills if they 
only evaluate changes in their portfolio every 13 
months. So the investor can suffer from myopic loss 
aversion because this myopic behaviour prevents him 
from using the best long term strategy and makes him 
think primarily about the present; which makes him 
evaluate the composition of the portfolio with great 
frequency. When the evaluation period is larger, the
attractiveness of stocks increases (Thaler et al, 1997; 
Thaler, 1999).    
3. The anatomy and history of Bubbles and 
Crashes 
Bubbles and Crashes are unique situations which 
have been studied across the years. Economic and 
financial theorists’ interest in this theme may be due to 
the fact that almost all propositions about investor 
rationality and then market rationality can be violated. 
Thus, in relation to the present article, a more realistic 
and improved investor profile can be constructed using 
this kind of situation because the efficient market 
hypothesis loses its descriptive validity. 
According to the efficient market hypothesis, a 
crash occurs when a dramatic piece of information is 
revealed. However, this approach can be considered 
reductive as the piece of information that triggered the 
problem may be unknown; even when known, a period 
must have preceded the crash that created the necessary 
conditions. 
In contrast with the market efficient hypothesis, it 
can be said that in these situations the market has 
entered an unstable phase so a small endogenous 
disturbance is sometimes enough, to trigger a shock 
(Sornette, 2003). The 1929 and 2000 crashes can be 
used to describe such unstable phase; in these years, the 
preview upward trend in stock prices never more was
seen, being replaced by an unstable and undetermined 
fluctuation, with special emphasis on losses.  
In fact, this situation is preceded by a rapid risein 
market prices, known as a bubble, created by growing 
interaction and cooperation between investors that can 
last for months and even years. Investors are unaware of 
the cooperation relations that result from a general 
belief in a new state of affairs, triggered primarily by 
the growth of a given sector or industry. The 
expectations and beliefs generated tend to be accepted 
by the group of investors, which helps prices rise 
quickly and vertically in some days (Galbraith, 1954; 
Kindleberger et al, 2005; Sornette, 2003). 
It can be concluded that the market’s unstable 
position will lead to a collapse and the piece of 
information that trigged the reaction can be considere  
secondary (Sornette, 2003).   
It will be now present a brief review of some 
historical stock market crashes to introduce the problem 
analyzed with the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma.  
However, the following criteria were used to select 
these historical events. 
• First, these events took place in the United States of 
America. Despite the globalization on the financial 
markets, there are cultural, social and other 
differences between investors in different countries 
and these can lead to singular behaviors and 
practices that could skew the analysis.  
• Second, these extreme events were primarily in the 
stock market. Events that originated in other 
security markets were excluded. 
• Third, these events were preceded by long periods 
of speculation and formation of a bubble, followed 
by very destructive crash. This explains why Black 
Monday of 1987 is not in the list. 
Two stock market crashes were chosen: The Great 
Crash of 1929 and the Dot-Com Crash of 2000. Both 
represent an optimal context of Bubble and Crash, 
meeting the above criteria. Both have long periods f 
speculation and strong crashes. The expectations and 
behavior of investors were quite similar, despite th  
industry or sector that leaded these beliefs. 
The financial crisis of 2008 was not chosen, 
because it can be assumed that Financial Institutions, 
e.g. commercial and investment banks and other 
financial companies, created the speculative moments 
and not investors. Moreover, this event originated in the 
real estate market and not the stock market. Finally, the 
effects of the crisis are still ongoing and it is dfficult to 
dissociate the subsequent effects from the recessive 
macroeconomic landscape.    
3.1. The Great Crash of 1929  
The 1920s could be called both a golden and a dark 
age. With World War I at an end, everyone was 
convinced that this would be a prosperous decade. 
Indicators for economic growth and development were 
improving; consumption was growing at a fast pace, nd
the level of prices was stable. 
It was the time of the American dream which 
foresaw a better, richer and fuller for one and all. It was 
a vision of a social order in which everyone could reach 
their maximum potential and break the barriers of the
old social hierarchy (Adams, 1931). 
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However, in the late 1910s, the rich were becoming 
richer more rapidly than the poor were becoming less 
poor. Because of this context, the financial and real 
estate markets provided the opportunity to get richwit  
the minimum effort, thus fulfilling the American dream 
and inverting the trend of the previous years (Galbraith, 
1954). This led to the great demand in the real estate 
market across the USA, particularly in Florida and 
should have been a forewarning of what would happen 
in 1929.  
The problem to accomplish this desire was that 
individuals simply believed that they were meant to be 
richer, regardless of their intellectuality restrictions, that 
is, cognitive limitations based on limited rationality and 
in the use of heuristics that could bias decision. Risk-
taking and irrational decisions were the order of the day. 
An entire industry was born to provide services to 
investors on the stock market such as brokerage firms, 
investment banks and investment trusts. The creation of 
a bubble was inevitable, the same for the following 
crash (White, 1990). 
3.1.1. The premonition 
In the early 1920s, the first signs of speculative 
behavior and irrational illusion came from the real state 
market. The main boom was in residential housing 
(White, 1990). Between 1921 and 1925 construction 
grew at a rapid pace with housing prices and building 
costs following the same trend. The boom was fueled by 
good macroeconomic conditions as well as the desire to 
become a home owner so as fulfill the American dream. 
This environment led to a change in the profile of 
investors with preference being given to short term 
profit as opposed to the constitution of savings.  
Florida is the most outstanding example of the 
boom in the real estate market. The standard of living 
and its transport system developed quickly and the 
climate made it the perfect location for a speculative 
wave in real estate. Investors were easily influenced at 
the time and simply wanted an excuse to believe in 
something. And that excuse and belief came from the 
expectation that Florida would become a dream place, 
full of opportunities and rich people enjoying the local 
conditions. In addition to the formation of positive 
expectations, the real estate market began to increase, 
making real the expectations of the investor. With time, 
the price of land rose and land owners were soon 
making big profits. After some time, the reasons for the 
investment on these lands started to disappear, exceeded 
by the possibility of easy profits. The problem arose on 
the beginning of 1926, when the number of new 
investors and houses began to fall. The subsequent 
decline in house prices was the beginning of a slow 
crash; the Great Crash of 1929 that followed dashed all 
hopes of recovery (Galbraith, 1953; White, 2009).  
The example of Florida reflects what happened 
across the USA and demonstrates that Americans were
driven by the desire for get-rich-quick investment 
opportunities in the early 1920s.  
3.1.2. From the prior years to the Great Crash – 
Euphoria and Mania 
At the beginning of the 1920s, conditions were ripe 
for the expansion of the stock market. Despite the good 
macroeconomic environment, stock prices were low and 
dividends reasonable. Most companies were making 
high profits and this seemed the prevailing trend. Some 
of these were new large-scale commercial and industrial 
enterprises that took advantage of innovative processes 
and technologies. They were able to capture economies 
of scale and scope which made their production 
processes very efficient. Moreover, there was a great 
transformation in the utility sector in large part because 
of the rapid growth in the modern industrial enterprises. 
In hindsight, high returns could not be sustained 
because the markets were poorly developed and 
companies held unbalance structures (Chandler, 1977; 
White, 1990). 
The greatest increase in the volume and prices of 
the stock market, particularly in the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average, began in 1927. In previous years, 
the stock market had flourished thanks to the growing 
interest of investors but prices were more volatile and 
the volume was relatively small. The slight growth until 
1925 was followed by a very volatile period in 1926 due 
to expectations of an unstable macroeconomic scenario, 
before returning to growth in 1927.  
This recovery was a product of a turnaround in the 
macroeconomic expectations, fueled several reasons, in 
which stood out the decrease in half percent made by 
the Federal Reserve in the discount rate, which 
increased the demand for Government Bonds. 
Commercial banks and some investors who held those 
bonds saw this as a good opportunity to sell and transfer 
their funds to the stock market (Galbraith, 1954). 
At the start of 1928, stock prices started rising more 
quickly. Just as with the real estate boom in the early 
1920s, investors only needed an excuse to believe in 
something and at this time they were convinced the 
stock market would bring them great wealth with little 
effort. With this it started a new “gold rush”, with stocks 
going up 10 or 20 basis points a day, with the utility and 
new technologies leading the gains (Galbraith, 1954).  
There was a frenzied increase in the volume of 
trading. In June 1928, the volume surpassed the utopian 
mark of 5.000.000 stocks, rising further to over 
6.000.000 in November (Galbraith, 1954). Also, 
according to Galbraith (1954) and Allen (1931), that 
year sealed the beginning of the speculative bubble, 
more specifically in March.  
Given the context of the 1920s and especially after 
1927, it became evident that those investors would need 
support and this provided a new market to explore. 
Regulations of commercial banks from the 19th century 
limited the provision of long-term loans; however, this 
was overcome by setting up wholly-owned securities 
affiliates that were allowed to enter in all aspects of the 
investment banking and brokerage business. On the 
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other hand, investors without enough capital to purchase 
a diversified portfolio of stocks saw a new industry of 
services develop, namely investment trusts. New ways 
of investing in the stock market also emerged e.g. 
margin deposits and negotiation i.e. the buyer, with 
margin, contracted a loan to buy a given number of 
stocks which remained in the possession of the broker 
as a guaranty of the loan. The buyer benefited from any 
value increase and with the same and fixed loan value. 
Whereas the investor was anxious to invest and benefit 
from the constant increases in the market, this kind of 
service sent supplementary funds to the market 
(Galbraith, 1954; Sornette, 2003; White, 1990). 
3.1.3. The year of 1929 and the Great Crash 
The year of 1929 began with a lull on the market. 
Despite the fact that, according with Galbraith (1954), 
the volume of stocks traded in January exceeded 
5.000.000 in five days, in February, the decrease in the 
UK reference rate slowed the rhythm of trading. The 
first glimpse of what was to happen in October came in 
March that year. On 25th March stock prices fell, and 
with the rate of broker loans increased to 14%; the 
following day a wave of fear resulted in a volume of 
8.000.000 stocks traded. Prices plummeted and both 
investors and brokers were panicking. The interest rate
on brokers’ loans reached 20% and telegrams began 
arriving requesting the delivery of the guaranty deposits. 
It was only Charles Mitchell’s announcement that the
Federal Reserve was obliged to stop a possible crisis 
that brought this panic under control (Galbraith, 1954). 
The power of information was doing its work. Also, 
1929 would be characterized by the extreme flow of 
information from the most diverse sources, trying to 
bring calm and confidence to the markets.     
Brokers’ loans indicate the degree of speculation on 
the market, and they were reaching high levels by this 
time. However, the interest rate indexed to these loans 
was more volatile than at other times. This dichotomy 
demonstrates the conflict of expectations. On one hand, 
investors believed that the market would continue to 
rise. On the other, brokers were more uncertain (White, 
1990).    
Market behavior was “normal” until August with 
days of trading seen as the last of the great 1920s. But 
despite this behavior, some macroeconomic indicators 
were telling a slightly different story. In July, the 
industrial production index reached a peak and went 
into decline the following months. The problem was 
based on the fact that the stock market only feels the 
effects of this context with some delay, and only when 
the investors and all the market becomes aware of  the 
macroeconomic situation. But at this time, investors 
were still confident (Galbraith, 1954). 
In September and October the market started to 
slow and Galbraith (1954) and Allen (1931) stated that 
September represented the end of the golden days. 
Nevertheless, investors’ expectations about the future 
were still quite optimistic in early October. 
Though high on October 15, the situation started to 
change on October 19. The news was that stock prices 
were falling and the guarantee margins were rising, 
which meant that prices were getting so low that they no 
longer represented the guarantee on the loans. On 
October 21 the market was unstable but losses were 
covered at the end of the day. Then a normal idea 
started to circulate: sell stocks and buy gold. Despit  the 
announcement by bankers that the market was fine, o 
October 23 there were continued losses and this led to 
the pre-crash on October, 24 (Galbraith, 1954; Sornette, 
2003). 
On that day, the volume of stocks traded reached 
12.900.000 and panic started to set in. Prices started to 
fall and most transactions were to sell stocks. The 
uncertainty fueling the panic was only controlled at 
midday when a group of bankers met to discuss what to 
do and how to save the stock market. They decided to 
gather resources. But it was what the bankers told to 
investors and not the resources that stabilized the 
market. The relieved investors started trading again so 
as to be part of the new wave of prices increases and by 
the end of the day the majority of the losses were 
compensated. The wave of confidence in bankers 
restored calm and everything was thought to be back to 
normal. It was now important not to miss the 
opportunity to buy stocks that were cheaper than ever 
(Galbraith, 1954; Sornette, 2003). 
Despite the restored levels of confidence, October 
28 started with losses and was a very difficult day on 
the market. The volume was high and most stocks were 
falling. The Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped 
almost 40 points and the volume was very high. The 
bankers met again but unlike the previous meeting, now
the concern was how not to help the market without 
increasing the wave of panic. But it was clear the next 
day that this idea had not worked. The final loss that 
day, known as Black Tuesday, was a little lower than 
the previous day but combined all the bad 
characteristics of the previous days . The volume of 
trading hit a historic maximum of 16.410.000 stocks and 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped almost 30 
points. The main company stocks continued to fall and
stocks of trust funds were going to zero value as the 
volume of brokers’ loans was decreasing. The bankers 
were held responsible for this situation and the help they 
had promised before did not come that day. Panic and 
fear set in (Galbraith, 1954; White, 1990 and 2004). 
Over the next days, there was some recovery and the 
real goal was to restore confidence among the leading 
actors on the market. Despite a brief recovery in 
December, this did not happen. The margin calls 
decreased by 25% and the volume of brokers’ loans also 
decreased. Some companies went bankrupt and trusts 
funds were seen as a negative factor to the recovery 
because their stocks were in steady decline and becam  
unsellable by November (Allen, 1931; Galbraith, 1954; 
White, 1990). 
3.2. Dot-com bubble of 2000 
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The 1990s was one of the most prosperous times in 
the USA economic and financial history. The good 
macroeconomic indicators, the bullish market, the 
launch of Internet and the advances in the technological 
and biotechnological sectors made Americans believe 
the future would be prosperous. 
Like the 1920s, these general conditions - economy, 
market and the emergence and development of a new 
sector – generated expectations and beliefs surrounding 
a New Economy. However, unlike the 1920s when most 
investors were just discovering the possibilities of the 
financial markets, especially the stock market, in the
1990s much of the population was familiar with the 
market and saw it as an inherent to the normal 
functioning of the economy. More specifically, 
investors were more knowledgeable and were not 
restricted to a particular class. It was just as normal to 
have an asset portfolio or invest in the stock market as 
to buy the groceries or pay the bills. It is therefo  no 
surprise that the majority of the investors were excit d 
about new, potentially lucrative investments.  
The investors’ appetite was precisely satisfied with 
the emergence of two new sectors, namely internet ad 
technological industries. They brought new scope to the 
market and, more importantly, new stocks. Soon, the 
hope for a New Economy was built around these 
companies and, like the utility sector in the 1920s, they 
fuelled the main channels of investment. Not 
surprisingly, this period of enthusiasm was followed by 
a speculative bubble.  
3.2.1. The rise of web companies and the investor 
profile 
In the early 1990s, the US macroeconomic 
environment was unstable. According to the FED 
(Federal Reserve), the US economy was in recession 
and inflation and unemployment rates were rising. As a 
result, the real per capita consumption in 1991 was the 
lowest that decade.   
The recovery began in 1992, coinciding with the 
IPO (Initial Public Offer) of American Online, the first 
big internet company. This act (IPO) became 
commonplace in the following years, taking place in 
well-known companies like Yahoo, Amazon or E-Bay 
(Liu and Song, 2001). 
However, following the American Online IPO, the 
internet only appeared in the news again in November 
1993. But at that time, very few people were aware of 
this new industry and even fewer had access to it. 
However, the computer and the possibility of accessing 
internet had such a powerful effect on people’s lives 
that it gradually acquired as much importance as 
television. The Worldwide web was even more 
attractive because the creation of each new application 
or site gave a sense of contributing to the country’s 
economic growth (Shiller, 2000). 
Investors’ interest in the potential and opportunities 
of the web triggered an exponential growth in IPOs for 
web companies, and with time this resulted this same 
interest resulted in enormous P/E (price over earnings) 
values and stock returns. The subsequent bubble 
generated by the expansion of dot-com companies and 
later tech and bio-tech companies was essentially a 
consequence of investors’ and the population’s new and 
different mindset in relation to previous decades; like in 
the 1920s, they saw an opportunity to get rich with the 
minimum effort (Shiller, 2000).  
Also, this desire for investment and wealth was 
reflected in cultural values. A successful business 
person became much more revered than a brilliant 
scientist or artist. The success cases in the financ al 
markets allied to the bullish trend increasingly gave the 
impression that investing in stocks was a quick and easy 
way to get rich with little effort. But the market was not 
nly driven by individual investors; the growth of 
pension plans and mutual funds were raising demand for 
stocks, particularly in tech and dot-com stocks which 
were growing at a frantic pace (Shiller, 2000). 
Just as in the 1920s, the stock market seemed to 
offer general investor a world of opportunities and their 
excessive optimism gradually made him neglect the 
risks and believe the market was more predictable than
it really was (Liu and Song, 2001; Shiller, 2000; White, 
2004).           
3.2.2. The speculative wave: Evolution of the 
Nasdaq, web and tech companies and investor 
behavior 
The motives that triggered this situation must be 
analyzed before the Nasdaq speculative bubble can be 
understood. Clearly this speculative wave cannot be 
explained simply by the behavior of web companies. 
Like on the 1920s, an analysis of the companies’ and 
investors’ behaviors proves to be the most efficient 
approach.   
The speculative wave that was seen on the Nasdaq 
Composite Index in the late 1990s is mostly associated 
with the huge surge in IPO’s, the dramatic rise in web 
companies’ stock prices as well as the interest and
expectations of the investors in this sector. Let’s look at 
an example. The Nasdaq Composite Index rose from 
755 points at the beginning of 1995 to 5.000 points  
March 2000, i.e. a valorization of 522%. The 
speculative bubble can also be isolated and seen at the 
end of 1998 and beginning of 1999 when the return 
rates of the Nasdaq frequently reached values of over
10% (Liu and Song, 2001; Sornette, 2003).  
This evolution can be analyzed in two phases. 
Firstly until 1997, it was almost entirely explained by 
the rise of the sector and the expectations and beliefs 
generated among investors that this was the sector of he 
future. These expectations changed the natural course of 
the market, triggering an abnormal demand for web 
stocks and thus a dramatic rise in prices. Secondly, after 
1998 in particular, the market and companies reacted 
and responded to this situation (Shiller, 2000).    
Companies that were already part of the index at 
this time like Yahoo and e-Bay, were successful and
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improving their results, prices and market share and
were therefore giving investors the right and expected 
signs. This was the ideal environment for more 
companies to join the market, though in many cases it 
proved too soon.  
This rush to the market by web and tech companies, 
many of which had been operating for only a few years 
or months, boosted offer and gave investors the 
impression that the market was developing fast, driving 
them to buy more and more stocks, often speculativey, 
bringing a wave of money into the market. However, 
even though many of these new companies in the IPO 
process were not as strong as the stock price reflect d, 
their price was rising every day. In conclusion, the 
illusion that was created of the sector and the market 
was unfounded. So why did these companies start the 
IPO process and why did they enter the market so soon?  
The answer to both these questions lies with the 
investor. Firstly, internet and tech stocks were 
irrationally overpriced. The recent performance of these 
companies on the market and the future growth 
prospects combined with investors’ beliefs made some 
young companies precipitate entry into the market to 
take advantage of these high prices. However, their 
stock prices reflected investors’ beliefs and expectations 
for the sector rather than their actual performance 
because these companies were too young and their 
financial structure was unbalanced. In time the stocks of 
the entire sector and index became overvalued (Liu and 
Song, 2001; Schultz and Zaman, 2000).      
A second explanation was the rush to grab market 
share. In an industry with enormous potential, an IPO 
provides capital for a company to invest in marketing 
and R&D even after losing money for several quarters 
as well as the possibility to acquire other companies and 
improve market share. As a result, the increase in the 
market share brings economies of scale, implying lower 
costs and more efficient development; in the mid-term, 
this improves the results of the company and its stock 
price (Liu and Song, 2001; Schultz and Zaman, 2000).        
It can be concluded that the market changed mostly 
because of investors’ positive expectations for inter et 
and tech companies, which tried to gain from this by 
going to the market thus giving investors the impression 
of an expanding sector. It did not take long before stock 
prices ceased to be based on fundamentals, but on the 
beliefs of companies and investors; jointly, they caused 
stock prices to rise and this brought benefits to both 
parties.  
However, the volume of short selling clearly 
demonstrates that as the Nasdaq improved, overpricing 
and speculation increased. For example, an average web 
firm in 2000 had almost 6 times as much of its public 
float shorted (Hand, 2000).  
3.2.3. The year of 2000 and the Crash1 
In 2000, tech and dot-com stocks were still 
increasing despite forecasts of a rise in the interest rate. 
When all other indices were decreasing, on January 4 
the Nasdaq rose to a record of more than 4.000 points. 
But Nasdaq’s volatility and fragility of started to be 
seen on January 7 when Lucent Technologies, a maker 
of telephone equipment, warned about lower than 
expected profits and sales. After this announcement, 
investors started the typical strategy of rotating new and 
old economy stocks in their portfolio. This gathered 
pace and by April became more frenzied and was 
closely linked with rising levels of myopic risk 
aversion. However, the channeling of almost all 
available money (such as dividend and tax gains) to do -
com and tech stocks continued as the falls in the market 
were seen as normal corrections. 
But this time, some analysts were underestimating 
investors’ strength and power, and continued to believ  
that fundamentals were strongest than psychological 
moods. Nevertheless, most financial analysts were 
avoiding dot-com stocks. 
Moreover, the volume of short selling remained 
high, with an average of 2.4 billion shares shorted; his 
indicated a strong bearish mood among the aggressive 
group of investors even though Nasdaq stocks rose 2 or 
even 3 digits. 
Another curious circumstance was the increase in 
the return rates of Nasdaq stocks despite rises in 
treasury bonds yields (which went from 4,8% in 1998 to 
6,3% in 2000), indicating the possible speculative 
effect, once the investors’ expectations, based on the 
good past performance of stocks and in the expected 
high consumption on the sectors to which they give 
support, were skewing their predictions. 
The investment fever continued in February with 
investors holding record credit in margin debt trade. It is 
interesting to note that the last time there had been such 
a high volume of credit in the hands of investors was 
precisely in September 1987 - the month before Black 
Monday, 1987. 
In March, just before the fall, Nasdaq rose to a 
record of 5.000 points, up from 3.000 points just four 
months earlier.. However, greater returns bring a serious 
increase in volatility, which ultimately increases the risk 
and consequently the costs of margin debt. 
In March 10, Nasdaq reached the 5.000 point mark 
for the last time. In the 3 following days, it registered 
point drops, setting the index at 4.500 points on the so-
called “correction days”. 
Allied to these situations, the FED began to express 
concern about the over-speculation on the market, 
indicating that these new economy companies were too 
                                                 
1 This point 2.3 was made essentially using news from the economy 
and markets section of the New York Times and New York Daily 
News, from January to April 
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dependent on the old economy and therefore a risk to 
the economy.  
The anxiety and uncertainty started to spread 
significantly when on March, 20 the Nasdaq recorded 
its biggest historical percentage loss, though was later 
exceeded negatively on March 30. Even the most 
optimistic investor began to question whether such a 
large number of corrections in such short period of time 
was normal?     
The events of April confirmed that this was not a 
period of correction or adjustment but the burst of a 
bubble. After all, the traditional laws of economy 
applied to the Nasdaq. Whereas on March 10 the 
Nasdaq was 24% higher than January, in April the gain
was only 12%. Almost immediately the margin debt 
rates started to increase even more than in March and 
the credit lenders became more suspicious about 
Nasdaq’s behavior and future. Also, the mutation and
roll-over in the composition of individual portfolis 
became more common, particularly among naive 
investors who bought tech and dot-com stocks just 
because they were rising.  
Even for the more skeptical investor, the worst was
confirmed on April 4. The market opened with 
countless sell orders which rapidly led to an almost 14% 
fall in the Nasdaq; and the volume for historical records, 
all of this on a day without any significant bad news. 
The market only recovered when the rumor that hedge 
funds were buying stocks and bringing liquidity to the 
market began to circulate, but the panic was already 
installed. Fear was abated when the day closed only 2% 
down.  
The market volatility was beginning to hit most 
investors who were losing capital and running out of 
cash to cover their losses. On the other hand, some 
aggressive investors saw this as a unique opportunity to 
buy stocks and to gain with the possible recuperation. 
However, even the biggest tech and dot-com companies 
were announcing losses and the commercial banks 
began to refuse money to invest in dot-com stocks, 
starting a run on convertible bonds. 
But the decline continued and by April 12 the 
Nasdaq had already lost more than 25% since its peak, 
closing the day more than 7% down at 3.769 points - the 
lowest at close of day since January. Already fully 
aware of what was happening, on April 14 Nasdaq 
recorded its biggest 1 day loss ever, down more than
10% to 3.321 points. The week closed with a 7 day fall 
of 25%, the worst week in its history. 
The Nasdaq never again reached the levels 
witnessed in this period and it continued to fall for a few 
more months. In addition, the USA subsequently went 
into macroeconomic recession and innumerous tech and 
dot-com companies went bankrupt. 
4. An Iterated Prisoners Dilemma approach  
This research addresses investor behavior in the 
stock market in extreme situations of speculation and
crash. In this context, the game chosen to obtain a 
significant explanatory efficiency must contain more 
than two individuals and, in this case, a finite but 
indeterminate number of investors. Despite the 
possibility of constructing a model with players acting 
either individually or as different groups, it was chosen 
the first alternative (N players acting individually) 
because joining individuals in groups can be complex 
given the need to access an enormous amount of 
information in order to form groups with a higher 
percentage of similarities.  
Moreover, a one period static model was discarded 
due to its lack of efficiency in situations in whic 
behaviors and actions tend to evolve over time and in 
response to the actions of adversaries. Therefore, a 
game was created with T infinite periods of time. 
However, the temporal horizon of the present game will 
be comprehended between [0+d;T-d], d≠0, implying the 
analysis of a sub-game. This procedure was selected 
because the objective is to focus on the speculation nd 
crash periods, which are only a fraction of the time T. 
Hence, there are d periods of time before the speculation 
period and d periods after the crash, which implies that 
the game has a partial but not a final result, because the 
game itself will continuously evolve to other states after 
the end of the sub-game analyzed. 
The aim is also to analyze the appearance of both 
cooperative and non cooperative behaviors as the game 
matures, what excludes games that do not consider the 
possibly of an evolution in aggregate behaviors and 
subsequent equilibriums. The context of information is 
asymmetric and imperfect; it is perceived and used 
gradually by the players, which does not imply à priori 
that they have advantage over the others. Thus, allied to 
this, the game is sequential because the investors do not 
act at the exactly same period of time, opening 
possibilities for the application of strategies that mutate 
in response to other players’ actions.  
Finally, it is assumed that the investor is not fully 
rational; this implies that despite the prior objective of 
optimizing his results, his actions can lead him to 
inefficient outcomes. Accordingly, the following game 
will not be based on a payoff function that expresses the 
result of the game for the player, but on a function hat 
will explain the incentive to cooperate and defect.  
Moreover, as investor preferences are not stable and 
rigid, actions can vary considerably in different time 
periods, making preferences closer to a hyperbolic 
function which considers the possibility of preferenc  
reversal. 
Given the abovementioned assumptions, an Iterated 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game (IPD) was selected and 
applied to N players and for the given temporal horizon 
mentioned, with non zero sum result, which indicates 
that the benefits and incentives to cooperate are not 
necessarily the same for defecting.  
In the basic form (for 2 players), the IPD assumes 
that each player can choose to cooperate or defect; the 
game can be repeated or iterated as many times as 
needed in a sequential fashion, implying that the 
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strategies used can mutate according with each player’s 
previous action. It is important to note that the players 
do not know the length of the game, thus invalidating an 
end behavior effect which may arise in super-games 
with finite time periods (Selten and Stoecker, 1986).   




Table 1: Standard Payoff Matrix (canonical form) of 
the IPD for 2 players 












In addition, the game will only be an IPD if the 
following assumptions are respected: 
a) T > R > P > S; 




It is assumed that circumstantial cooperative 
equilibriums may occur, but that these will not be 
dominant and stable (Aumann, 1959). As the number of 
iterations increase, a Nash Equilibrium can be reach d 
but only if the players have monotonic preferences, 
which is easier to achieve with 2 players.  
However, the 2 player form of the game is 
considered to be reductive because, when dealing with 
real-life situations, more realistic results can be o tained 
with an N player game (Davis et al, 1976). 
It has been therefore selected the more usual 
approach, namely an N player IPD, which implies the 
following: 
• Each player faces two choices: cooperation or 
defection; 
• The defection (D) is a dominant pure strategy for 
each player and it will be better if he always choose 
that option; 
• The equilibriums achieved are not stable in some 
cases, principally in cases of cooperation (C). 
Thus, the game can be presented as follows. 
 
Table 2: Matrix presentation of the IPD for N players 
Nº of Cooperators 0 1 … X … N-1 
Cooperate C0 C1 … Cx … CN-1 
Defect D0 D1 … Dx … DN-1 
 
As in the 2 player form, with N players the game 
will only be an IPD if the following conditions are 
achieved: 
a) Dx > Cx for 0  ≤ x  ≤ N-1 
b) Dx+1 > Dx and Cx+1 > Cx for 0 ≤ x < N-1  
c) Cx> (Dx+Cx-1)/2 for 0 < x < N-1  
In a concrete model, the CN-1 and DN-1will be payoff 
functions that translate the incentive to actions of 
cooperation and/or defection.  
One of the important features of this model is the 
possibility of mutation in the behavior and actions made 
across the game (dealing only with pure alternatives) 
and this can be expressed with resource to the strategies 
used. 
Nevertheless, players in the real world do not know 
the actions taken by others in real time, and there is a 
delay that can be caused by innumerous factors. Hence, 
the investor only knows the adversary moves with a ǽ 
period delay, improving his knowledge of the game 
with time (memory), i.e. he will learn as the game 
evolves. This learning ability is a very important factor 
to avoid the possibility of superrational players. 
Moreover, even with the premise of learning and delay, 
some mistakes can be made by the player because he i  
unable to process all the available information and 
therefore selects information using anchors and 
heuristics; this can lead to judgment errors.      
4.1. The application of the ITD to investor 
behavior in extreme financial events  
After contextualizing the model to be applied 
(IPD), on the following pages it is defined the problem 
and the parameters of the model before analyzing the 
results obtained. 
4.1.1. Problem definition  
The above mentioned examples of financial crashes 
of 1929 and 2000 demonstrate that the investor faces 
two distinct situations. First, the context of a speculative 
bubble whereupon the investor increased or maintained 
his positions in overvalued stocks, especially in 
companies belonging to the new sector of the time 
(utility in the 1920s and dot-com and new technologies 
in the late 1990s). At that time he was being driven both 
by the desire to maximize profits and emotional 
considerations like euphoria and mania. Also, despit  
the short duration of the speculative bubble generated, 
the returns and the volatility implied in the stocks is 
linked more to increasing demand by investors than to 
other factors, thus suggesting a more deterministic trend 
in these periods than others in which the random walk 
prevails. 
Secondly, there are crash situations and these have 
a different profile. Unlike the bubble context, the 
investor tries to avoid losses at all cost. However, this 
feature does not appear unexpectedly so the transition 
made between speculation and crash is not sudden. In 
the months before the crash in 1929 and 2000, a market 
scenario compounded with more volatility and rising 
but more unstable trend in prices was observed. It can 
be also assumed that some investors were starting to 
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have doubts about the real value of the stocks in their 
portfolios by this time. However, initially the defection 
from these positions was made by a minority; most 
investors started to sell their positions at the moment of 
the crash, thus decreasing the liquidity and increasing 
the volatility on the market.  
Given these two contexts, the problem to be applied 
to the IPD can be presented as follows: the investor has 
two choices, both on speculation and crash. He can 
cooperate with the rest of the investors to maintain he 
speculative bubble and the rising trend, or he can defect 
and invest in other kind of assets, which means that he 
is not interested in maintaining the situation of 
speculation. Thus, the players in the game can take the 
following actions:  
• Cooperation (C): can be seen as a collaboration 
between investors to maintain (even if 
unconsciously) the speculative bubble by investing 
or sustaining positions on stocks that are 
overvalued; 
• Defection (D): logically this is the opposite 
situation, i.e., the investor is not interested in 
maintaining the bubble and thus takes two possible 
actions: the investor does not want to invest in ths
kind of stock, or he has these stocks but does not 
want to maintain his position and therefore sells 
them and does not support the trend. 
Defection can also result in the possibility of 
leaving the game or remaining but with positions in 
different assets.  
4.1.2. The formalization of the game  
(a) Players 
The number of players in the game is indeterminate 
but is a finite set of dimension N. Also, for each player 
& ∈ ( is a nonempty set Ai of actions available that are 
pure: cooperation or defection. The players have the 
following characteristics: 
• They are not fully rational, acting more in line 
with the Simon’s (1955) postulate of limited 
rationality which implies that at some time in the 
game they may not optimize their actions; this 
may lead to the maintenance of long periods of 
cooperation; 
• They do not have monotonic preferences or a 
stable set of preferences, which means that there 
is not a relation f i on A. Instead they may have 
hyperbolic preferences which allows for mutation 
in the preference set and reversal of a preference 
A over preference B in a given time period Ti; 
• The risk profile of the players/investors respects 
the Prospect Theory utility function, which means 
that they are not always risk averse. The degree 
will depend on and vary according to whether 
they are dealing with gains or losses. 
• Although a player can exit the game when he 
defects, however that is not a dominant attitude 
across all group members, i.e., when they defect, 
they can still be part of the game but with 
investments in other assets, or they can even 
observe and then enter again at a later time. 
(b) Time 
This game considers an infinite time period T. 
However, the game begins a few periods before the 
beginning of the bubble and continues when this 
analysis ends, evolving in more d time periods. This 
also implies that the model occurs in a sub-game; this 
does not represent a problem because, as argued by 
Friedman (1991), a game that begins in a given time 
period that does not coincide with the time period T0 
may have all the same characteristics as a game and 
realize the same quilibria.  
(c) Payoff or incentive function  
The payoff function in the IPD works as a 
mathematical translation of the incentive to cooperate. 
Thus, there are two payoff functions: one for 
cooperation and another for defection. However, neither 
of them is static and stable, varying with the number of 
cooperators, which also varies according to the 
trategies used by each player. 
The payoff functions are denominated Cx and Dx 
and belong to a space set N of the number of 
cooperators between {0,1,2,…,N-1} 
(d) Information and strategies   
The game is played in an imperfect information 
context in which it is assumed that players have to make 
decisions at several moments without knowing all the
game history or the adversaries’ choices (Fiani, 2004). 
However, as the investor is not fully rational, it is 
implied that even decisions made in a perfect 
information context would not be supported by all 
known information because of their cognitive 
limitations. 
In addition, players’ actions are supported by the 
use of Tit-for-Tat strategy. However, because the game 
begins at 0+d time periods, it is impossible to know 
when the first move of defection really happened. 
Nevertheless, it is important to say that players take the 
choices made by adversaries into consideration, but with 
a ǽ lag period which is not standard for all players. This 
must be assumed because, without lagging, the game 
was on a short period stabilized on a Nash Equilibrium 
of defection (and therefore the preferences monotonic). 
Also, they will not remember all the previous moves 
from the lag period because of the amount of 
information, and it is therefore assumed that only a few 
moves prior to the lag period will be remembered. 
4.1.3. The model and results  
The initial problem investor’s face is to preserve th
speculative bubble, maintaining their positions or 
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investing in assets that are overvalued, which implies 
taking cooperative actions. However, as time evolves, 
more investors will share similar investment decision  
and this implies a stronger incentive to cooperate than to 
defect. But some investors realize the situation ca be 
unstable as the bubble matures, and see defection as a 
more appealing incentive.  
Given this problem, the following payoff functions 
can be applied, proposed by Seo, Cho and Yao (2000). 
	)* = +, -, − /	012	0 ≤ - ≤ (	                                    (3) 
3* = √2-		012	0 ≤ - ≤ (						                                    (4) 
Note that x expresses the number of cooperators in 
the game in each time period Ti and k is an unknown 
variable that indicates the exogenous incentive to 
defection, which can include any type of information 
(even a crucial piece that can trigger the crash), being 
seized only by some players. However, they will start to 
defect when this parameter k becomes too big, making 
the incentive to cooperate smaller than the respective 
one to defect.  
Also, as referred, the players make use of a Tit-for-
Tat strategy, which implies that the decisions made will 
take the actions taken by other players into 
consideration, but only a small number of moves and
with temporal lag.  
5 = 	6, 012	855	9: 				                                                   (5) 
; = (< ∗ 9) − 5, 012	855	9: 		                                      (6) 
Therefore, based on the idea of Axelrod (1987), the 
equation (5) indicates the number of lag periods in all 
the time Ti period, and equation (6) provides a 
quantification of how many periods of information a 
player can remember prior to the lag, where ω (a 
constant) is the percentage of the fullness of periods 
prior to the lag . 
However, the players will only remember the 
moves made by some adversaries, mainly because it is a 
context of incomplete information and the investor 
cannot assimilate an unreal amount of information. 
Thus, despite the natural dominance of defection, as 
shown in Figure 3, with a small k, as the number of 
cooperators grows, the incentive to cooperate will 
increase more quickly than to defect, thus implying an 
intersection between both incentives at a given poit in 
time in which cooperation thereafter becomes more 
appealing.    
 
 
Figure 3: The evolution of the payoff result for 
Cooperation and Defection across a growing number of 
cooperators 
Therefore, the game can be analyzed in two distinct 
parts. 
The first begins on the initial intersection point 
described in Figure 4 as point (1). The k value at this
time is small and investors are making use of a Tit-for-
Tat strategy. As mentioned, the moment at which the 
game starts is not relevant to the present study. Thus, 
the period starting at point (1) is linked to sentiments of 
euphoria and mania, as seen in the 1929 and 2000 
bubbles, when an increasing number of investors were 
investing in overvalued positions.  
The number of cooperators starts rising rapidly and
this may be due to the desire to make gains with stock  
belonging mostly to sectors of the new economy, as 
seen with the utility sector in 1929 and dot-com and 
technologies in 2000. Thus, as the existing cooperators 
maintain their positions, partially due to the strategy 
being used, new players begin cooperating so as to 
enjoy the evident returns. The rising trend in 
cooperating players causes the speculative bubble to 
grow, as does the incentive that sustains it.  
This scenario can be characterized as a minimal 
equilibrium of cooperation because the number of 
cooperators is bigger than that of defectors, and the 
growth of the incentive to cooperate is more accentuated 
than the one linked to defection. Hence, with the 
maintenance of a low k, the number of cooperators 
continues to rise to a point at which the equilibrium 
reaches its strongest position (point (2) on Figure 4). 
Thus, the peak of the speculative bubble (or minimal 
equilibrium of cooperation) in point (2) coincides with 
moments seen in the two events previously analyzed. In 
the Great Crash of 1929, it refers to late 1928 when t  
volume of stocks traded exceeded utopian marks for that 
time of 5 and 6 million stocks. In the crash of 2000, this 
is the moment when Nasdaq reached 5.000 points. 
Thereafter, the equilibrium becomes more unstable. 
In the events described, the markets became more 
unstable and volatile after the peak, and investors, banks 
and states became more anxious and nervous. The 
irregularity of the market can be seen as a result of a
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explanation for this defection may reside in the value of 
parameter k. This parameter contains pieces of 
information that indicate that the bubble is not stable 
and that it is better to start leaving the positions held on 
overvalued assets before a stressful drop in the market. 
However, this information is only perceived by some 
investors. Thus, some cease to cooperate and the 




Figure 4: The evolution of the number of players 
cooperating or defecting across time: (1) indicates the 
beginning of the minimal equilibrium of cooperation; 
(2) Point in time at which the minimal equilibrium of
cooperation is strongest; (3) Beginning of the minial 
equilibrium of defection which will become stronger but 
not stable as a solution of the game 
This moment marks the beginning of the end of that 
period. As more players become aware of the key pieces 
of information, they start to see the cooperative payoff 
diminishing at a faster pace than that of defection; this is 
explained by the value of k, which is reducing the 
incentive. There is a causality relation in which more k 
implies less cooperation and therefore a downward 
trend in the cooperative incentive.  
As the players are using a Tit-For-Tat strategy, they 
start to realize some defective actions in some other 
players and therefore also start also to replicate their 
actions and choose defection; this implies a reversal of 
preferences that had been relatively stable for a long 
period of time (period coincident with speculation). This 
implies another intersection between the number of 
players cooperating and defecting. This intersection will 
leads to moment (3) and can be associated to the 
beginning of the crash.  
As referred, the moment after the peak of the 
bubble is related to an environment of increasing 
volatility and anxiety among market agents. The more 
unstable variations of the market can be interpreted as 
more defective actions made by players. Hence, the 
game reaches a new equilibrium when more players ar 
defecting than cooperating; this is a minimal defection 
equilibrium which coincides with the moments related 
with the crash on the market. As more players defect, 
the incentives decline but the incentive to cooperate 
becomes smaller more quickly than to defect. Thus, the 
gain of stability in the equilibrium coincides with t e 
fall of the market, implying also domination over the 
previous one. 
Nevertheless, this equilibrium will not be stable for
a long period of time because investors do not have a 
rigid set of preferences, implying the inexistence of a 
Nash point of equilibrium. However, in future time 
periods the dominating equilibrium will evolve to other 




Figure 5: An illustrative diagram of transition between 
the equilibriums of the game 
As established in Figure 5, the problem has three 
phases. The first involves the growth of the minimal 
equilibrium of cooperation, coinciding with the 
expansion of the speculation period. The second period 
is characterized by increasing instability on the markets, 
associated to more defective actions made by investors 
and making the equilibrium volatile. The final period 
marks the transition between equilibriums and coincides 
with the crash on the markets and implies the choice to 
defect dominates for most players.  
5. Concluding notes 
This research aimed to address the behavior of 
investors in extreme situations on the stock market. The 
main purpose was to shed light on some features of the 
investor profile in these situations so as to understand 
actions taken individually and as a group.  
Thus, to obtain a realistic investor profile in those 
situations, the main features of the investor were 
approached in a number of ways. First, the postulate of 
rationality was analyzed and the existing literature on 
asset pricing and portfolio theory was set against the 
ideas of behaviorists and neuroscientists; they confirm 
first that the economic agent is not fully rational, being 
maybe closer to Simon’s (1955) notion of limited 
rationality and second, that feasible models and theories 
can be constructed which do not take pure rationality s 
the central premise the. In addition to behavioral 
economics and finance, the evolutionism approach and 
neuroeconomics also seem to agree that the utilitarian 
agent is not the most efficient way to address some 
problems.  
The decision-making process is another key feature, 
particularly with regard the investor’s set of prefer nces. 
If the options offered in the real world are 
systematically changing and the actual individual has a 
dynamic and mutated set of preferences which may be 
biased by the influence of limited rationality and 
information processing, then the process of decision 
making has to be more complex than shown and derived 








C C C ……. C C C
D D D…….
The minimal equilibrium of
cooperation becomes more strong
The minimal equilibrium of
cooperation becomes less strong and
more instable
The minimal equilibrium of
defection becomes strongest and
dominates the previous
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function and the set of preferences, the degree of risk 
aversion or the process of accounting gains and losses 
by the economic agent become so complex that it is 
difficult to resume all in simple axioms. However, it 
was showed that the complexity of the agent’s profile 
implies that new models, and the one analyzed in this 
study, have to take this kind of consideration into 
account.  
Given the above, the model generated through the 
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma gives rise to the hypothesis 
of the existence of minimal equilibriums of cooperation 
(in the speculative bubble event) and defection (at 
previous moments and during the crash period), which 
are not stable because of players’ perceptions of key 
information and their impact on the set of preferences. 
However, it was found that there equilibriums play  
successive role if the aim is to see the game as a whole 
and not as a sub-game. It should also be stressed that 
when individuals act as a group, they do not secure 
cooperation, and self-interest is a key factor in the 
decisions made. Nevertheless, investors’ motivations in 
the speculative bubble event can degenerate on attitudes 
of cooperation, as commonly seen at times on commons 
tragedies in natural resources. In conclusion, the 
proposed hypothesis launched was corroborated by the 
model used. However, the results can vary in line with 
the type of event analyzed.  
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